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COMMENT
Sanctions for Frivolous Litigation
Take Hold in New York
INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been mounting concern among lawyers and
judges over widespread misuse of the legal process.' These concerns in
many instances have resulted in legislative and/or court reform aimed at
curbing abusive and frivolous litigation practices. 2 New York state is
one such example.
Effective January 1, 1989, the State Office of Court Administration
(OCA)3 enacted Parts 37, 100 and 130-a of the Rules of the Chief Judge
of the Court of Appeals which pertains to costs and sanctions in civil and
criminal proceedings.' Part 37 authorizes an award of costs, including
1. See Cady, Curbing Litigation Abuse and Misuswe A Judicial Approach, 36 DRAKE L. RE'V. 483
(1987) (the central problem in the American legal system today is abuse, only some of which is cured
by legislative and common law remedies). See also Teschner, Judges Close the Courts: "Frivolous"
Cases, Judicial Immunity, and Our Endangered Common Law Tradition, 35 FED. BAR NEWS & J.
23 (Jan. 1988).
2. See Hinerfled, The Sanctions Explosion, 7 CAL. LAW. 35 (Nov. 1987) (judges are punishing
litigators' misbehavior more often and more severely). See also notes 9 & 30 and accompanying text.
3. N.Y. CONsT. art. VI, § 30, gives the legislature power to delegate to the chief administrator
of the courts any of the legislature's powers to regulate practice and procedure in the courts. See also
N.Y. JUD. LAw art. 7-a, § 21 l(1)(b), 205-206 (McKinney 1983). (The legislature invokes that power
and delegates to the chief judge the authority to adopt rules. The Office of the Court Administration
acts under the authority of the chief administrator).
4. McKinney's 1989 New York Rules of Court § 37.1, 130.1-130.5, 130-a.1 to 130a.3.
Part 130
§ 130.1 Costs; Sanctions (a) The Court, in its discretion, may award to any party or
attorney in any civil action or proceeding before the court, except where prohibited by
law, costs in the form of reimbursement for actual expenses reasonably incurred and
reasonable attorney's fees, resulting from frivolous conduct as defined in this Part. In
addition to or in lieu of awarding costs, the court, in its discretion may impose financial
sanctions upon any party or attorney in a civil action or proceeding who engages in
frivolous conduct as defined in this Part, which shall be payable as provided in section
130.3 of this Part. This Part shall not apply to town or village courts, to proceedings in a
small claims part of any court, or to proceedings in the Family Court commenced under
Article 3,7,8 or 10 of the Family Court Act.
(b) The court, as appropriate, may make such award of costs or impose such financial
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reasonable attorney fees, the imposition of financial sanctions, or both,
sanctions against either an attorney or a party to the litigation or against both. Where
the award or sanction is against an attorney, it may be against the attorney personally or
upon a partnership, firm, corporation, government agency, prosecutor's office, legal aid
society or public defender's office with which the attorney is associated and that has
appeared as attorney of record. The award or sanctions may be imposed upon any attor-
ney appearing in the action or upon a partnership, firm or corporation with which the
attorney is associated.
(c) For purposes of this Part, conduct is frivolous if:
(i) it is completely without merit in law or fact and cannot be supported by a reason-
able argument for an' extension, modification or reversal of existing law; or
(ii) it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to
harass or maliciously injure another.
Frivolous conduct shall include the making of a frivolous motion for costs or sanc-
tions under this section. In determining whether the conduct undertaken was frivolous,
the court shall consider, among other issues, (1) the circumstances under which the
conduct took place, including the time available for investigating the legal or factual
basis of the conduct; and (2) whether or not the conduct was continued when its lack of
legal or factual basis was apparent or should have been apparent to counsel.
(d) An award of costs or the imposition of sanctions may be made either upon mo-
tion in compliance with CPLR 2214 or 2215 or upon the court's own initiative, after a
reasonable opportunity to be heard. The form of the hearing shall depend upon the
nature of the conduct and the circumstances of the case.
§ 130.2 Order Awarding Costs or Imposing Sanctions
The court may make an award of costs or impose sanctions or both only upon a
written decision setting forth the conduct on which the award or imposition is based, the
reasons why the court found the conduct to be frivolous, and the reasons why the court
found the amount awarded or imposed be appropriate. An award of costs or the imposi-
tion of sanctions or both shall be entered as ajudgment of the court. In no event shall the
total amount of costs awarded and sanctions imposed exceed $10,000 in any action or
proceeding.
§ 130.3 Payment of Sanctions
Payments of sanctions by an attorney shall be deposited with the Clients' Security
Fund established pursuant to section 97-t of the STATE FINANcE LAW. Payments of
sanctions by a party who is not an attorney shall be deposited with the clerk of the court
for transmittal to the State Commissioner of Taxation and Finance.
§ 130.4 Application to Officers Other Than Judges of the Courts of the Unified Court
System
The powers of a court set forth in the Part shall apply to judges of the Housing Part
of the New York City Civil Court and to hearing examiners appointed pursuant to sec-
tion 439 of the Family Court Act, except that the powers of Family Court hearing exam-
iners shall be limited to a determination that a party or attorney has engaged in frivolous
conduct, which shall be subject to confirmation by a judge of the Family Court who may
impose any costs or sanctions authorized by this Part.
§ 130.5 Exception
This rule shall not apply to requests for costs or attorneys' fees subject to the provi-
sions of CPLR 8303-a. McKinney's 1989 New York Rules of Court § 130.1-130.5.
Part 130-a imposes financial sanctions upon any attorney in a criminal action who,
without good cause, fails to appear at a time and place scheduled for a criminal action. It
provides in pertinent part:
In determining whether an attorney's failure to appear at a scheduled court appear-
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for frivolous conduct in litigation by any party or attorney. Part 130 lists
definitions and factors to be considered by judges when imposing penal-
ties. The third regulation, Part 130-a, sets forth specific sanctioning pro-
cedures for abuses in the criminal courts. The enactment of these three
rules marks the culmination of a movement toward imposing sanctions
for abusive litigation practices. This movement has found "fertile new
ground in New York state."5 The OCA's promulgation also departs sig-
nificantly from past New York practice and raises important concerns
for practitioners.
Part One of this comment presents a history of the sanctioning
movement as it has developed in New York State. This includes a brief
explanation of the American Rule of costs and some exceptions to it.6
One particular exception, litigation practices motivated by bad faith, is
recognized in New York state, and some case law applying the exception
will be discussed. Further, section 8303-a of the New York Civil Practice
Law and Rules (CPLR),7 a very limited New York sanctioning statute, is
explored.
In Part Two, portions of the text of the Rules of the Chief Judge of
the Court of Appeals are detailed with an in-depth analysis of some im-
portant provisions. Various collateral issues are also examined: among
them, the factors that determine the reasonableness of attorneys' fees and
ance was without good cause and in determining the measure of sanctions to be imposed,
the court shall consider all of the attendant circumstances, including but not limited to:
(i) the explanation, if any, offered by the attorney for his or her nonappearance; (ii) the
adequacy of the notice to the attorney of the time and date of the scheduled appearance;
(iii) whether the attorney notified the court and opposing counsel in advance that he or
she would be unable to appear; (iv) whether substitute counsel appeared in court at the
time previously scheduled to proffer an explanation of the attorney' s nonappearance and
whether such substitute counsel was prepared to go forward with the case; (v) whether
an affidavit or affirmation of actual engagement was filed in the manner prescribed in
Part 125 of the Uniform Rules for the Trial Courts of the Unified Court System; (vi)
whether the attorney on prior occasions in the same action or proceeding failed to ap-
pear at a scheduled court action or proceeding; (vii) whether financial sanctions have
been imposed upon the attorney pursuant to this section in some other criminal action or
proceeding; and (viii) the extent and nature of the harm caused by the attorney's failure
to appear.
McKinney's 1989 New York Rules of Court § 130-a(1)(b). 130a.1 to 130-a.3.
5. Menaker, Sanctions for Frivolous Litigation: Should New York Have A Counterpart to Federal
Rule l?, 59 N.Y.S.B.J. 31 (Nov. 1987) ("Since 1983, each of the appellate divisions has upheld
sanctions awarded for wasteful or unmeritorious pretrial tactics."). Id. at 32, n.14.
6. See infra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
7. N.Y. CIV. PRAc. L. & R. § 8303-a (McKinney 1989). See infra notes 61-75 and accompany-
ing text.
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the relationship between the recently enacted Rules and the New York
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Part Three examines some negative effects that can result from a
sanctioning rule. These effects include the rule itself becoming an abusive
tactic, a chilling influence on the bar, and unfair or improper application
of the rules. Many of these dangers are minimized through the proce-
dural safeguards provided in Part 130.
This comment maintains that the OCA's enactment of sanctions for
frivolous conduct was both necessary and inevitable in our increasingly
litigious society.' They are carefully and thoughtfully drafted by profes-
sionals who have firsthand knowledge and experience with court prac-
tices. Indeed, the Rules go far beyond the federal response9 to frivolous
claims. The New York doctrine strikes a balance between deterring mer-
itless litigation, on the one hand, and encouraging the pursuit of minority
interests and the presentation of new legal theories, on the other.
The OCA's adoption is not enough, though. In order for the Rules
to deter practitioners and clients they must be taken seriously by the bar.
It is only through an express mandate by the legislature that attorneys
will recognize that the risk of sanctions is real and judges will feel com-
fortable imposing them. The New York legislature must follow the
OCA's lead and either adopt Parts 37 and 130 verbatim or draft its own
statute with the essential provisions contained in Part 130.
8. See generally Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 Nw. U. L. REv. 767 (1977)
(explosion of law already has harmed American body politic and if allowed to continue will be
incapacitating). But see Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L.
REv. 4 (1983) ("Comparison of current with past litigation rates shows a recent rise, but present
levels are not historically unprecedented."). Id. at 5.
9. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Rule 11 requires that "every pleading, motion, and other paper" be
signed by an attorney of record or the pro se litigant. It continues:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the
signer has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of the signer's
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in
fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modifi-
cation, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litiga-
tion .... If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court,
upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay
to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of
the [violation], including a reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See also infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
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I. HISTORY
A. The American Rule
In New York, as in most jurisdictions, absent a specific statutory
provision or an agreement between the parties, a prevailing litigant is
precluded from recovering attorneys' fees from his opponent.' 0 The
"American Rule" reflects a policy of guaranteeing "unfettered access to
the courts for all citizens with genuine legal disputes,"'" and has been
defended as part of our "sacred common law heritage."' 2 Underlying
this rule is the premise that imposing costs of attorneys' fees on the losing
party will diminish access to courts.'" It is claimed that "democratic and
libertarian principles"14 require free and equal access to American courts
because access is the "cornerstone of the American concept of justice."' 5
Despite its time-honored presence, there have been numerous criti-
cisms of the American Rule 16 and some legal scholars have strongly
10. See, eg., Aleyska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (5-2 deci-
sion) (Douglas & Powell, J J. took no part in the case) (American Rule can only be changed by
Congress, not by the courts); Greco v. GSL Enter., 137 Misc.2d 714, 521 N.Y.S.2d 994, 994 (Civ.Ct.
1987) (contractual right to attorney's fees is reciprocal); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York,
762 F.2d 243, 252 (2d Cir. 1985) (recognized American rule, but allowed award of fees for frivolous
civil rights and antitrust claims), cerL denied, 108 S.Ct. 269 (1987); see also Rahabi v. Morrison, 81
A.D.2d 434, 440 N.Y.S.2d 941, 944 (2d Dept. 1981) (in absence of contractual or statutory authori-
zation, or unless court finds extraordinary circumstances, award of fees denied); Brownie's Army &
Navy Store v. E.J. Burke, Inc., 72 A.D.2d 17, 424 N.Y.S.2d 800, 803-04 (4th Dept. 1980) (provisions
of U.C.C. allowing seller to recover incidental damages did not authorize award of fees); Taboada v.
Bank of Bablyon, 95 Misc.2d 1000, 408 N.Y.S.2d 734, 736 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (in absence of contractual
or statutory authorization, award of fees denied).
11. Comment, The Dynamics of Rule 1i. Preventing Frivolous Litigation by Demanding Profes-
sional Responsibility, 61 N.Y.U.L. REv. 300, 304 (1986) This policy of equal access to justice is
reinforced by "[I]iberal pleading requirements, the availability of contingent-fee representation, and a
significant number of one-way, proplalntiff fee-shifting statutes ... " Id. at 304-05.
12. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 792,
(1966).
13. For a discussion of the policy implications of the American Rule of costs, see Mallor, Puni-
tive Attorney's Fees for Abuses of the Judicial System, 61 N.C.L. RE. 613, 615-19 (1983).
14. See McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages,
15 MINN. L. REV. 619 (1931).
15. Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 vAND. L. REV. 1216, 1216
(1967) (an analysis of the reform movement emerging in the 1960's urging the adoption of some
form of the English system).
16. See generally Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 IOWA L. REV.
75 (1963) (proposal that U.S. follow English practice of assessing attorney's fees as court costs to
losing party to alleviate congested courts and encourage respect for the law.); Greenberger, The Cost
of Justice: An American Problem, An English Solution, 9 VILL. L. REV. 400 (1964) (the time has
arrived for serious consideration to be given the English cost system.); Ehrenzweig, supra note 12 (a
plea for the abolition of the American Rule, an institution erroneously held in awe as part of our
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urged the adoption of the "English Rule"1 7 of costs which "explicitly
serves to discourage resort to the judicial system for the resolution of
disputes."1 8 Critics blame the American rule for clogging court calen-
dars19 and facilitating meritless claims.2" Commentators also complain
that the American Rule fails to compensate victims fully. 21 Attorneys
fees are a cost of litigation that must in effect be subtracted from most
awards. In a case where a potential plaintiff has a meritorious but small
claim, the failure to compensate fully is especially troublesome. Such a
party might forego bringing an action because any judgment recovered
would not equal the cost of bringing the action.
Despite the debate, the American Rule is not likely to be aban-
doned. Rather, Congress has attempted to deal with inequities inherent
in our cost system through alternate means. 22 For example, due to the
inability of the poor to exercise their right to free access to the courts,
Congress has made legal services available to the poor by funding pro-
grams such as referral services and legal aid.23 A large part of the modifi-
"sacred common law heritage"); McCormick, supra note 14 (the less than complete adoption of the
English rule fails to fully vindicate a party's wrong and is wholly inadequate in achieving fairness.).
17. See Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L. J. 849 (1929). Since 1275, the English system has allowed
attorneys' fees to be awarded to the prevailing party. The premise of the English rule is to provide
full compensation to the winner, not to punish the losing party or deter frivolous litigation.
For a discussion of why the English Rule did not continue in America, see Ehrenzweig, supra
note 12, at 798-99 (state legislatures in the mid 1800's, in attempting to perpetuate what they consid-
ered a sound legal rule of recovery of attorney's fees by the prevailing party, made the mistake of
fixing the amount recoverable in dollars and cents rather than in percentages of the amount recov-
ered or claimed). Cf Kuenzel, supra note 16, at 81 (in creating a new government, a state must
encourage its citizenry to submit to an established system for the resolution of their disputes so that
concerns over points of justice, such as making one whole, are secondary.); see also Aleyska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240, 247-69 (1975) for a history and rationale of the abandon-
ment of the English rule.
18. See Menaker, supra note 5 at 32.
19. See Kuenzel, supra note 16, at 75-80.
20. See Note, supra note 15, at 1222; Comment, supra note 11, at 306.
21. See Kuenzel, supra note 16 at 84-85 (in an ordinary negligence case on a contingent fee basis
(one-third) "the actual compensatory damages reaching the injured party amount only to two thirds
of the actual value of the harm inflicted."). See also Comment, supra note 11, at 307 (Attorney's fees
as a cost of litigation must, in effect, be subtracted from most awards.).
22. For alternative solutions to both the American Rule and the English Rule, see Note, supra
note 15, at 1230-33. Alternatives include a statutory scheme of percentage compensation for each
service performed, the Canadian system which awards fees found in a series of scales based on the
amount in issue, and a statute based on the premise that a judge shall award reasonable attorney's
fees to the prevailing party. Id.
23. See generally Note, Neighborhood Law Offices: The New Wave ofLegal Services For the Poor,
80 HARv. L. REv. 805 (1967) (The quantitative increase in legal services available to the poor recog-
nizes that the overriding interest of the poor is the elimination of poverty. This is an interest lawyers
must advocate.). But see Note, supra note 15, at 1216 ("[t]he poor will never have completely free
access to the courts unless the American Rule.. .is changed."); Ehrenzweig, supra note 12, at 794
1990] FRIVOLOUS LITIGATION
cation of the rule has also resulted from legislative policies. Both
Congress and the New York State Legislature have altered the general
rule and have provided statutorily for an award of attorneys' fees in vari-
ous instances. 24
Likewise, courts have amended the general rule of recovery through
the exercise of their inherent power to "regulate and control the conduct
of litigants and counsel" appearing before them.25 This power has been
specifically defined to encompass the award of attorney's fees to a suc-
cessful party "when his opponent has acted in bad faith, vexatiously,
wantonly, or for oppressive reasons."' 26 The federal court's bad faith ex-
ception is both compensatory and punitive in nature and has been con-
strued to reach three types of behavior: prelitigation misconduct; the
assertion of frivolous claims, counterclaims, and defenses; and vexatious
("[Tihe little man in his every day dealings.., can and must be helped at this time, not by the
business of neighborhood referral or the charity of legal aid, but by reform of our law of counsel
fees."); Kuenzel, supra note 16, at 85 ("When the cost structure operates on a basis that grants a
preference to a financial interest... the system is entitled to little respect.").
24. For a collection of federal statutes providing for an award of attorneys fees, see Aleyska
Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 260-61, n. 33. Examples include 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 (1970) (antitrust); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970) (public accommodations); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(k) (1970) (equal employment); 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970 & 1989 Supp.) (fair housing). N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. L. & R. 8303-a, discussed infra, notes 58-70 and accompanying text, is the only fee shifting
statute in New York state. The following provisions are New York State examples where an award
of attorneys' fees are not automatic but are within a court's discretion: N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 89,
Art. 6 (McKinney, 1988) (Freedom of Information Law) N.Y. DEPT. & CRED. LAW § 276-a (Mc-
Kinney, 1945) (setting aside a conveyance made with bent to defraud) N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§§ 236(9) (a), 237, 238 (McKinney, 1986) (marriage dissolution proceedings); N.Y. PuB. SERV.
LAW § 93 (McKinney 1955) (divulging contents of telephonic messages); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW.
§ 623(h) (7) Art. 6 (MeKinney 1986) (dissenting shareholder suits); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 909
(McKinney 1976) (class actions).
An award of attorneys' fees, although not expressly stated, has been found to be implicit in the
following statutes: N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L. & R. § 5015 (McKinney 1963) (relief from judgment or
order) N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 3126 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1988) (penalties for refusal to
comply with order or to disclose). Finally, the following statutes authorize courts to impose defaults,
which implicitly include the power to do something less, namely, to impose attorneys' fees as a
condition for excusing default: N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 3215(a), 3012(b), 3042, 3126(3), and 3404
(McKinney 1970).
25. Gabrelian v. Gabrelian, 108 A.D.2d 445, 454, 480 N.Y.S.2d 914, 922 (2d Dept. 1985), ap-
peal dismissed, 66 N.Y.2d 741, 488 N.E. 2d. 111 497 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1985).
26. Ltown Limited Partnership v. Sire Plan, Inc., 108 A.D.2d 435, 440, 489 N.Y.S.2d 567, 572
(2d Dept. 1985) (quoting F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974); see,
Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973); Annotation, Award of Counsel Fees to Prevailing Party Based on
Adversary's Bad Faith, Obduracy, or Other Misconduct, 31 A.L.R. FED. 833 (1977) for a collection of
cases applying the federal bad faith exception. See also In Re Cosmopolitan Aviation Corp., 763
F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1032 (1985) sub. nom. Rothman v. New York State
Dept. of Transp.; Sharrow v. Fish, 501 F.Supp. 202 (1980), aff'd without op., 659 F.2d 1062;
Buckton v. National Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 436 F.Supp. 1258; Stegeman v. Detroit Mortg. &
Realty Co., 541 F.Supp. 1318 (1982).
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conduct during the course of litigation."
In 1983, Congress incorporated the bad faith exception previously
exercised by federal courts into amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Rule 11 requires an attorney to sign his name on "every
pleading, motion, and other paper."28 By her signature, the attorney or
pro se litigant attests:
that to the best of [her] knowledge, information and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry it (the pleading, motion or other paper) is well grounded
in fact and is warranted by the existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not inter-
posed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
29
Many states have passed similar provisions. 30
B. The New York Bad Faith Exception
Prior to the recent enactment of Parts 37, 100 and 130-a, New York
courts, like their federal counterparts, had recognized an exception to the
American Rule that each party to a lawsuit must bear his own attorneys'
fees absent expressed statutory or contractual authorization to the con-
trary. The obdurate behavior exception permits a court, through its in-
herent powers, to impose an award of attorneys' fees on a party who has
litigated in bad faith.3
The Appellate Division first considered the issue of whether New
York courts possessed "inherent powers" to deal with bad faith litigation
practices in Gabrelian v. Gabrelian.32 While in Gabrelian a sanction is-
sued by the trial court was held unwarranted based on the facts, 33 the
27. See, Mallor, supra note 13, at 632-646. See generally Note, Attorney's Fees and The Federal
Bad Faith Exception, 29 HASTINGS L. J. 319 (1977) (survey of federal bad faith exception, its history
and development and a plea for California to adopt the exception as other states have done).
28. FED.R.CIv.P. 11. Amended Rule 11 was part of a broader reform effort aimed at preventing
abuse of the judicial system. For a sampling of federal court application of Rule 11, see Dries &
Krump Mfg. v. International Ass'n. of Machinists, 802 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1986); MGIC Indem.
Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1986); In re Ginther, 791 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1986); see
also Baron, Steppe on Board the Rule 11 Bandwagon, 35 CLEV.ST. L. REv. 249 (1986); For an in-
depth and comprehensive analysis of Rule 11, see Nelken, Sanctions Under Rule 11-Some "Chil-
ling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GA. L. REV. 1313 (1986).
29. FED.R.CIv.P. 11.
30. See Hull, Attorney's Fees for Frivolous, Unreasonable or Groundless Litigation, 20 IND. L.
REv. 151, 154, 28 (1987). These states include Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Mas-
sachusetts, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Washington and Wisconsin.
31. Gabrelian v. Gabrelian, 108 A.D.2d 445, 48 N.Y.S.2d 914 (2d Dept. 1985).
32. Id.
33. In Gabrelian, the party against whom the sanction was being considered was the defendant
in a divorce action. His wife had been granted a divorce many years earlier in a decree that directed a
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court took the opportunity to explore what specific sources of authority
permitted a court to direct payment of fees in response to vexatious prac-
tices, and whether courts were limited to those situations.
The majority enumerated five different grants of authority for di-
recting payment of fees.34 The court concluded:
In fact, there appears to be no statute, short of contempt, which even color-
ably empowers a Court to impose a financial assessment upon a party or its
attorney for general abuse of their judicial process, such as repeated filings
of frivolous motions. Nevertheless, we conclude that such a power is de-
rived from the so-called "inherent powers doctrine."
35
They continued,
[T]hese powers are inherent in the sense that they exist because the court
exists; the court is, therefore, it has the powers reasonably required to act as
an efficient court.
3 6
The majority proceeded to enumerate the various instances where
the inherent power has traditionally been invoked: as a basis for calendar
control; as authority to assign individual cases to particular justices; as a
power to formulate and promulgate rules of practice; as a means to per-
mit the court to exercise its jurisdiction and to protect it from unreasona-
ble restraint; as a method to correct mistakes or errors in judicial records;
and finally as authority to "enforce respect for and compliance with the
court's judgments and mandates by punishment for contempt. ' 37 The
specific sharing of their property. Alleging that she violated the property direction, he moved to
punish her for contempt. Special Term denied the motion because the defendant had raised the
identical issues in an earlier Supreme Court motion and in two district court actions. It found him
guilty of harassment, imposed various costs and fees including a $500 fine, and enjoined him from
bringing further proceedings against his former wife until he paid it all. On appeal, the Court can-
celed the fine as unwarranted, stressing the fact that the husband appeared pro se. Id.
34. Gabrelian, 489 N.Y.S. 2d at 917-18. The five grants of authority examined are as follows: (1)
N. Y Ci. Prac. L. & R. articles 81 & 82 authorize courts, in their discretion, to award costs in
actions on motions or appeals, but the costs are strictly limited by statute to fixed amounts "bearing
no relationship to the amount actually expended by the party in successfully asserting its right"; (2)
The contempt power, criminal and civil, which has been judicially codified since common law into
Judiciary Law § 753, et. seq., was held inapplicable because the facts did not conform with the
statutory provisions therein; (3) Domestic Relations Law § 238, § 245, limits recovery of fees to
contempt proceedings to enforce a provision of a divorce judgment requiring the payment of a sum
of money; (4) N. Y Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 5015(a) authorizes a Court to grant relief from ajudgment or
order "upon such terms as may be just." (sanctions pursuant to are generally related to relieving a
party of default); (5) NY Ci. Prac. L & R. § 3126 allows imposition of monetary sanctions as a
penalty for refusal to comply with an order of discovery or refusal to disclose, inapplicable to facts.
Id.
35. Id. at 918.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 919-20.
1990]
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court refers to the foregoing as "merely illustrative" because "the inher-
ent power, is, by its very nature, not susceptible to precise definition." 38
From this line of reasoning, the majority, absent any express legislative
or judicial mandate, found support to extend the inherent powers doc-
trine to the imposition of financial sanctions for abusive litigation
practices.39
Regarding the application of the specific power to sanction, the Ap-
pellate Division held that whether the inherent power should be invoked
in a particular case must be determined on an ad hoe basis.40 In so doing,
a court should determine whether a sanction would be "just and fair"
and whether it would be consistent with "sound policy considerations. '41
The court stated that when invoked, "due process requires that it be done
upon fair notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard."'42 The opin-
ion did not elaborate what fair notice and an opportunity to be heard
mean. The court recognized that this power was not subject to "direct
democratic controls" and warned that it should be invoked "with great
restraint. '43 It also said that a court should first consider the "availabil-
ity of statutory remedies (e.g., CPLR §§ 2004, 3126, 5015), and the stat-
utory contempt power (Judiciary Law art. 19)"" before exercising its
inherent authority.
Justice Lazer, who concurred only in the cancellation of the fine,
severely attacked the majority's expansion of the court's common law
inherent powers. Stating unequivocally, "I cannot agree that the judicial
system possesses some amorphous inherent power,"'45 Justice Lazer fore-
saw three unwanted consequences of the exercise of such a power: the
38. Id.
39. Id. at 920-21. The majority cites previous New York cases that have held that a court's
inherent powers encompass the authority to impose financial sanctions for abusive litigation prac-
tices. See Gottlieb v. Edelstein, 84 Misc.2d 1053, 375 N.Y.S.2d 532 (Sup.Ct. 1975); Kimple v. Auble,
87 Misc.2d 997, 386 N.Y.S.2d 967 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Karutz v. Chicago Tit. Ins. Co., 112 Misc.2d 815,
451 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (N.Y.App. Term, 2d Dept. 1981); Aslanis v. Southwest Sewer Dist., 92 A.D.2d
855, 459 N.Y.S.2d 631 (2d Dept. 1983).
40. Gabrelian, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
41. Id. The Court expands on the elements of "sound policy considerations," for example, pro-
moting speedy, efficient and inexpensive resolutions of lawsuits, on their merits, and deterring ne-
glect, delay and intentional abuse such as the institution of successive, baseless and frivolous legal
proceedings that serve no purpose other then harassment and that hinder the courts from acting
upon more meritorious claims." Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. The Court also decided that the monetary amount could be paid directly to the opposing
party or to the Court, "when it appears that the efficient disposition of the business before it has been
impaired- .. " Id. at 923.
44. Gabrelian, 489 N.Y.S. 2d at 922. See also supra note 24.
45. Id. at 923.
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routine demand for sanctions in pleadings, affirmations and affidavits in
both civil and criminal litigation; an impediment to the right of access to
the courts; and a "damaging impact on that continuing development
which lies at the heart of the common law by discouraging the assertion
of new and novel claims for recovery."46 He also found fault with the
majority's grant of power because no limitation was placed on the
amount of the sanction, no clear guidelines were established for its exer-
cise and only vague suggestions as to appropriate procedural safeguards
were made. 47
Lazer was also troubled by the fact that "frivolity, like beauty, is
often in the eyes of the beholder. An action or motion which may appear
frivolous to one judge may in fact be the beginning of a new development
in the law."4 He warned that without the "constant influx of novel
claims, innovative procedures and fresh ideas" our common law would
"inevitably stultify and decay" and that courts are "too overwhelmed by
the familiar litany of complaints to distinguish between the innovative
and the absurd." 49 The availability of an appeal offered no comfort to
Lazer because an appeal would carry its own threat of sanctions.5 0 He
argued, instead, that what the majority had outlined in its decision was a
hybrid of the contempt power which did not survive the enactment of
article 19 of the Judiciary Law and that, if there should be "an embellish-
ment of the judicial power to restore litigation abuses," the remedy lies in
"carefully drawn legislation which will fix the limits of the power." 51
Although, as the majority points out, "the apocalyptic consequences
envisioned in the concurring opinion appear overdrawn, '52 it is clear that
the unbridled, ad hoe power that the majority espouses is not the best
solution for curtailing abusive litigation practices. At the very least,
judges might be hesitant to exercise such a power absent legislative
support.
Since Gabrelian, the use of "inherent powers" to reach obdurate be-
havior has had a mixed reception. In Photosound v. Gourdine,53 the First
46. Id. at 923-24. X
47. Id. at 925.
48. Lazer cites as examples: the demise of the citadel of privity; the growth of a cause of action
in strict products liability; the cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional harm; and the
claim for contribution by an active tortfeasor. Id.
49. Id. at 926.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 929.
52. Id. at 923.
53. 118 A.D.2d 472, 499 N.Y.S.2d 751 (Ist Dept. 1986) (copy of judgment served upon corpo-
ration's attorney which contained the stamp of the county clerk was served with proper "notice of
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Department, unlike the Second Department in Gabrelian, did not find it
necessary to address the issue of whether an inherent power exists. In the
only related case to come before it, Mink v. Conifer Park, Inc., 4 the
Third Department upheld a sanction against counsel in the amount of
850 dollars for disruptive tactics and the use of coarse gutter language
during a deposition. The Second Department, however, has heard the
largest number of cases seeking sanctions. In a case handed down the
same day as Gabrelian, the Second Department found a similar sanction-
ing power for appellate courts when an appeal is deemed frivolous." In
five other Second Department rulings, sanctions were refused in three
cases and upheld in two, pursuant to the inherent powers doctrine.56
Similarly, trial court decisions have produced mixed results.57
In contrast, the Court of Appeals has spoken more definitively on
the propriety of sanctioning based on an inherent power. In A.G. Mainte-
nance Corp. v. Lezak,s" the Court of Appeals sustained the lower court's
refusal to compel sanctions for patently bad faith litigation in the absence
of a statute or a court rule. The majority did not expressly overrule
Gabrelian, nor did it foreclose the possibility that such a power exists,
but its plea for legislative action preventing the exercise of inherent pow-
entry" so that corporation attorneys who made frivolous contempt motions for improper notice were
required to pay opposing party attorney's fees under N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 8202 (McKinney
1981 & Supp. 1989)).
54. 142 A.D. 2d 899 531 N.Y.S.2d 400 (3d Dept. 1988).
55. Ltown Limited Partnership v. Sire Plan, Inc., 108 A.D.2d 435, 489 N.Y.S.2d 567 (2d Dept.
1985), modified, 69 N.Y. 2d 670, 503 N.E. 2d 1377, 511 N.Y.S. 2d 840 (1986) (civil appeals by
intervenor were of such a frivolous nature that competent counsel could not possibly have failed to
recognize it).
56. See Volkell v. Volkell, 112 A.D.2d 293, 491 N.Y.S.2d 738 (2d Dept. 1985); Aluminum Mill
Supply Corp. v. Skyview Metals, Inc., 117 A.D.2d 765, 499 N.Y.S.2d 98 (2d Dept. 1986); Morabito
v. Hagerman Fire District, 123 A.D.2d 700, 506 N.Y.S.2d 959 (2d Dept. 1986) (refusal of sanctions);
but see Lohmiller v. Lohmiller, 118 A.D.2d 760, 500 N.Y.S.2d 151 (2d Dept. 1986) (sanction against
husband in divorce action due to a motion to compel wife to a psychiatric exam where husband's
motion papers exaggerated wife's psychiatric condition and motion was clearly calculated to delay
trial); Sasson v. Sasson, 134 A.D.2d 491, 521 N.Y.S.2d 276 (2d Dept. 1987) (husband's counsel in
divorce action sanctioned $750 for failing to submit an affidavit or appear on scheduled hearing
because of actual engagement in trial of another matter, where absence resulted in default against
husband).
57. E.g., Town of Poughkeepsie v. County of Dutchess, 129 Misc.2d 312, 492 N.Y.S.2d 1009
(Sup.Ct. 1985) (refusal of sanctions); but see McLoughlin v. H.J. Henke, 130 Misc.2d 1091, 499
N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sup.Ct. 1986) ($500 sanction against plaintiff's attorney where he had failed to in-
form the court that his client was unavailable and case was not ready until after jury was selected
and case was scheduled for trial); Soybel v. Gruber, 132 Misc.2d 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d 354
(N.Y.Civ.Ct. 1986) (attorney fined $200 for the time, trouble, expenses and inconvenience caused by
the filing of a note of an appearance on behalf of a party by whom he was never retained).
58. 69 N.Y.2d 1, 503 N.E.2d 681, 511 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1986).
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ers in the sanctioning area was clearly announced.5 9 The Court of Ap-
peals urged, " .[t]he most practicable means for establishing
appropriate standards and procedures which will provide an effective
tool for dealing with this problem is by plenary rule rather than by ad
hoc judicial decisions. '
In summary, the exercise of an inherent sanctioning power has not
been extensively used since its broad declaration in Gabrelian and has
been used quite infrequently since the Court of Appeals decision in
Lezak.
C. Amended New York CPLR Section 8303-a61
At about the same time that the Gabrelian decision was handed
down, there was a widespread reformation of the insurance industry re-
sulting from continually increasing malpractice premiums.6 2 One off-
shoot of this movement was the passage of an amendment to New York's
CPLR section 8303.63 Although limited in scope, this amendment was
the first legislative response allocating to New York courts the power to
sanction attorneys for frivolous litigation practices. In fact, it is still the
only legislative response dealing with the curtailment of abusive practices
and is an integral part of the sanctioning movement in New York.
Section 8303-a of New York's CPLR is an unambiguous statute au-
thorizing the courts to award costs and attorneys fees against any party
found to have commenced or persisted with a claim, counterclaim, cross-
59. The effective result of Lezak was that "[u]ntil the Legislature acts by statute or the Chief
Judge and Chief Administrator act by rule to authorize the imposition of such money sanctions, with
a provision presumably drafted with circumscribing guideposts for the judges, money sanctions for
frivolous litigation practices will continue to be limited to the instances in which they are presently
authorized N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L & R. 8303-a (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1989); Siegel, Court of Ap-
peals, Addressing Frivolity Sanctions, Holds "Plenary Rule" Required: But Existing Statute Allows
Sanctions in Tax Cases, NEW YORK STATE LAW DIGEsT No. 325 at 1 (Jan. 1987).
60. Lezak, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
61. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 8303-a. CPLR 8303-a was actually amended twice in 1986. The
first amendment is discussed herein. The second amendment (L.1986, c.458, § 11) just added
podiatric malpractice to the medical and dental malpractice to which the 1985 enactment was
limited, overlooking that under the first 1986 amendment, extending 8303-a to all personal injury,
property damage and wrongful death cases, that was not necessary. See Mitchell v. Herald Co., 137
A.D.2d 213, 218, n.2, 529 N.Y.S.2d 602, 605 n.2 (4th Dept. 1988) ("The duplication is the apparent
result of the Legislature's attempt to amend a statute which had previously been amended out of
existence.") Lawyers should use the first (the L.1986, c.220) version as the one presently applicable.
62. See Connors & Bull, New York's Controversial Medical Malpractice Bill, 58 N.Y.S.B.J. 10
(Feb. 1986).
63. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 8303-a. For a lengthy discussion of the legislative concerns and
goals behind the enactment of N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 8303-a, see also Eagle Ins. Co. v. Ruiz,
141 Misc.2d 815, 818-22, 535 N.Y.S.2d, 297-30 (Sup.Ct. 1988).
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claim or defense found by the court to be frivolous. The provision was
adopted in 1985 as part of a comprehensive legislative package designed
to reduce rising insurance rates for medical and dental malpractice, and
was extended in 1986 to all actions for personal injury, injury to property
or wrongful death. 61
Subdivision (c) of CPLR section 8303-a defines frivolity, similarly to
Federal Rule 11, by requiring a finding that the claim or defense be
"commenced, used or continued in bad faith, solely to delay or prolong
the litigation or to harass or maliciously injure another" (subdivision
(c)(i)) or that it be "commenced or continued in bad faith without any
reasonable basis in law or fact and cannot be supported by a good faith
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law" (sub-
division (c)(ii)).
65
These criteria are both subjective and objective - under both defini-
tions of frivolity (subdivisions (c)(i) and (c)(ii)), the court must find bad
faith, which necessitates an examination of the intent or motive of the
party against whom sanctions are sought. If the court finds that a viola-
tion has occurred, it must award to the prevailing party costs and reason-
able attorney's fees in an amount not to exceed 10,000 dollars.66 CPLR
section 8303-a(b) provides that the assessment may in the court's discre-
tion be made against the party, or his attorney, or both. Subsection (c)
(ii) which states that a legal position must have a reasonable basis in law
or fact, authorizes the court to forgive this type of transgression if it finds
that the attorney promptly abandoned the claim or defense as soon as he
learned that it had no defensible basis.
Initially, some positive aspects of section 8303-a should be high-
lighted. First, it gives courts a source of authority for imposing penalties
beyond their ad hoc inherent powers. Second, CPLR section 8303-a pro-
vides a definition for frivolity so that the determination is not left solely
to a judge's whim. Indeed, the definition of frivolity is somewhat strict,
requiring bad faith in both instances. Third, the provision has a monetary
limit. It puts a cap on a judge's discretion and limits the possible injustice
that could result if the statute is applied incorrectly. Fourth, it is broad
enough to reach both claims and defenses. If it were limited only to the
pursuit of frivolous actions, it would fail to reach a significant area of
litigation practice that is just as susceptible to abuse.67 Fifth, it allows for
64. See CONNORS & BULL, supra note 62.
65. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 8303-a(c)(i) and (ii).
66. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 8303-a (a).
67. Siegel, supra note 59, at 2, col. 1.
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prompt discontinuance of a meritless claim or defense once the party
learns or should have learned of his mistake. Where a claim might seem
legitimate at the start, once its frivolity becomes apparent, it can be
abandoned.
Likewise, there are various negative aspects of CPLR section 8303-
a, foremost of which is its limited scope. The statute reaches only tort-
based actions; "it does not apply to contract, corporate, commercial,
property, matrimonial, or any other actions, just tort." s6 8 Although it
does apply to claims and defenses, it does not reach motions.69 Further,
although frivolity is defined, there is still a vagueness and uncertainty to
the standard. It is not clear where the attorney's duty to zealously repre-
sent the client ends and his responsibilities as a officer of the court be-
gin.7" In addition, the provision that allows the attorney or the client to
be sanctioned can put the attorney at odds with his clients because "often
the lawyer can be relieved of the sanction if he can show that what was
done was the client's fault."71 Finally, section 8303-a of the CPLR leaves
too much to the discretion of the judge. There is no express provision
requiring a hearing prior to a determination or any requirement for the
court to issue a statement of reasons for their finding.
CPLR section 8303-a has had little impact on abusive practices
since its enactment. It has been invoked eight times in New York but in
five of those cases, courts have refused to award monetary sanctions.72
68. Id. at 1, col. 2.
69. 22 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. 202.12(g) authorizes the imposition of sanctions for "the
making of unnecessary or frivolous motions" but does not address whether attorneys fees are includ-
able. For a decision applying Uniform Rule 202.12(g) in combination with N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R.
8303-a, see England v. Gradowitz Bros. Realty Corp., 137 Misc.2d 21, 519 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup.Ct.
1987) where the trial court awarded a $250 sanction against plaintiff's attorney where he had moved
for summary judgment in a typical slip and fall case and the court deemed his "bare" complaint
"frivolous, unnecessary and wholly without merit." England v. Gradowitz Bros. Realty Corp., 519
N.Y.S.2d at 785.
70. Ethical Consideration 7-1 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states: "The
duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously within
the bounds of the law." N.Y. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, EC 7-1 (1975).
7L See Siegel, supra note 67, at 2, col. 2.
72. See Banat v. Passalaqua, 142 A.D.2d 706, 531 N.Y.S.2d 106 (2d Dept. 1988) (plaintiff's
claim to recover damages for perjury and fraud in prior civil proceeding outside designated classes in
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 8303-a); Narins v. DeBrovner, 141 A.D.2d 381, 529 N.Y.S.2d 316 (1st
Dept. 1988) (plaintiff's counsel delaying of discontinuance did not meet "bad faith" requirement of
8303-a(c) (ii)); Sokal v. Sofokles, 136 A.D.2d 535, 523 N.Y.S.2d 155 (2d Dept. 1988) (malpractice
action commenced well before the effective date of legislative enactment of 8303-a); Metzger v. West-
chester County Medical Center, 141 A.D.2d 512, 529 N.Y.S.2d 711 (2d Dept. 1988) (no statutory or
case law basis for an award of attorney's fees, costs or interest); Fanelli v. Adler, 131 A.D.2d 631,
516 N.Y.S.2d 716 (2d Dept. 1987) (plaintiff's action as a matter of law, within purport of N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. L. & R. 8303-a wasn't frivolous); but see Mitchell v. Herald Co., 529 N.Y.S.2d 602 (4th Dept.
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Since sanctions are mandatory upon a finding of frivolity, the courts have
been reluctant to find attorney conduct meeting the bad faith standard.
Curiously, in the three decisions sanctioning pursuant to section 8303-a,
none was related to the general theme of the 1985 Legislative program
under which CPLR section 8303-a was enacted. In Sirota v. Kloogman,
73
an attorney was sanctioned under section 8303-a for the improper entry
of a judgment. Similarly, sanctions were imposed in Mitchell v. Herald
Co.,74 as a result of the meritless pursuit of a libel action against a news-
paper. Finally, in a recent lower court decision, Eagle Ins. Co. v. Ruiz,
7
1
section 8303-a was construed liberally to reach abusive action on the part
of a motor vehicle insured.
II. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATION PARTS 37, 100, 130-A
In 1987 the Office of Court Administration, in response to the Lezak
decision, proposed Rule 130 of the Uniform Rules and Part 37 of the
Rules of the Chief Judge, which were submitted to the bar for com-
ments. 76 The proposal remedied many of the shortcomings of CPLR sec-
tion 8303-a, but was met by opposition from the majority of attorneys,
either to the rule's concept or its application. 77 Promulgation of a sanc-
tioning rule was then deferred pending consideration of the issue by the
New York State Legislature. 78 The assumption was that the legislature
would consider the subject of sanctions and produce its own provision.
When the 1988 session passed with no action, OCA returned to the rule
1988) (libel action had no basis in law or fact, remanded to determine sanction against attorney and/
or client); Sirota v. Kloogman, 140 A.D.2d 426, 528 N.Y.S.2d 127 (2d Dept. 1988) (entry of judg-
ment after court determined lack of personal jurisdiction where plaintiff already arranged for reser-
vice warranted $250 sanction against attorney); Eagle Ins. Co. v. Ruiz, 535 N.Y.S.2d 294 (Sup.Ct.
1988) (insurance company's raising of sham contentions, misstatements of law, submission or rank
hearsay, failure to conscientiously investigate the claim and the imposition of an invalid disclaimer
warranted allowance of attorney's fees).
For an interesting application of N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 8303-a, see Weber v. Kessler, 135
Misc.2d 618, 516 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup.Ct. Dutchess Ctyl987) where, in combination with N.Y. Civ.
PaRAc. L. & R. 8501(a), the Court required the posting of adequate security from an out of state
plaintiff in case his claim was shown to be frivolous.
73. 104 A.D.2d 426, 528 N.Y.S.2d 127 (2d Dept. 1988).
74. 137 A.D.2d 213, 529 N.Y.S.2d 602 (4th Dept. 1988), appeal dismissed 72 N.Y.2d 952, 529
N.E.2d 427, 533 N.Y.S.2d 59 (1988).
75. 141 Misc.2d 815, 535 N.Y.S.2d 294 (Sup.Ct. 1988).
76. For a text of the proposed rules, see 198 N.Y.L.J. 37, Aug. 21, 1987, at 3, or The Council on
Judicial Administration, Proposed Court Rules Authorizing Costs and Sanctions For Frivolous Con-
duct in Civil Litigation, 42 RECORD 1045 (1987).
77. Dixon, Increase in Sanctions Probed by Trial Lawyers, N.Y. STATE BAR NEws, Dec., 1988,
at 14, col. 4 and at 19, col. 1.
78. Id. at 14, col. 4.
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and redrafted it after considering the comments the initial circulation
had elicited, this time with more success.79
In pertinent part, Rule 130 permits the court in its discretion to
award "any party or attorney in any civil action or proceeding" costs in
the form of reimbursement for actual expenses reasonably incurred and
reasonable attorney's fees resulting from "frivolous conduct."" ° It further
provides: "[i]n addition to or in lieu of awarding costs, the court, in its
discretion, may impose financial sanctions . .. "81 This rule, unlike
CPLR section 8303-a, reaches any type of civil action. Further, frivolous
"conduct" is a broad category that covers claims, defenses, motions and
appeals.
82
For purposes of Part 130, conduct is deemed frivolous if: "it is com-
pletely without merit in law or fact and cannot be supported by a reason-
able argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law,"
or "it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the
litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another."8 3 These definitions
are patterned after CPLR section 8303-a, which is structured similarly to
Federal Rule 11.84 Indeed, federal case law on Rule 11 will doubtless be
referred to in some measure for guidance in determining frivolity under
Part 130. Part 130's definition of frivolity expands the reach of section
8303-a. The malpractice statute requires bad faith, whether it be in bring-
ing an action to delay, harass or injure another, or in commencing an
action that lacks a reasonable basis in law or fact. Part 130's definition is
met, regardless of the attorney's subjective good faith, as long as the con-
duct is "completely without merit in law or fact and cannot be supported
by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
existing law."85 As a result, the attorneys' duty to scrutinize carefully the
merits of their clients' positions, both legal and factual, is heightened.
Part 130 also requires the court to consider, when determining
whether conduct is frivolous, among other things:
(1) the circumstances under which the conduct took place, including the
time available for investigating the legal or factual basis of the conduct; and
79. Id.
80. 22 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. § 130-1.1(a) (1988) (effective Jan. 1, 1989). See supra
note 4 for a complete text of the rule.
81. Id.
82. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 8303-a applies only to claims, defenses, counterclaims and cross-
claims. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 8303-a (McKinney, Supp. 1989).
83. 22 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. § 130-1.1(c)(1) and (2) (effective Jan. 1, 1989).
84. See Siegel, supra note 59, at 2, col. 2.
85. 22 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. § 130-1.1(c)(1) (effective Jan. 1, 1989).
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(2) whether or not the conduct was continued when its lack of legal or
factual basis was apparent or should have been apparent to counsel.86
This requirement, coupled with Part 130.2 which states that the court
can award costs or impose sanctions only upon a "written memorandum
decision" setting forth the conduct on which the award is based, the rea-
sons the conduct is frivolous and that the amount imposed is appropri-
ate, ensures that the court will inquire into the underlying circumstances
motivating the parties. Moreover, the writing requirement also estab-
lishes a record for a reviewing judge on appeal; whereas, CPLR section
8303-a contains no writing requirement.
Most important, Rule 130.1(d) allows the attorney a "reasonable
opportunity to be heard." Even though the rule states that the "form of
the hearing shall depend upon the nature of the conduct and the totality
of the circumstances of the case," this is a critical provision. As one critic
warns, "[s]ince financial hardships can be a substantial hardship on the
person penalized, the rule should be designed to minimize the likelihood
of arbitrary or erroneous determinations. ' 87 A hearing will further the
goal of minimizing the likelihood of arbitrary or erroneous determina-
tions by forcing the sanctioning judge to listen to any intervening circum-
stances that could explain the attorney's conduct. A brief conference in
the judge's chambers may be all that is needed.
In addition to the above enumerated provisions, there are many
other aspects of Rule 130 that are significant.8 8 One of these is Part
130.1(c), which provides that, "[frivolous conduct shall include the
making of a frivolous motion for costs or sanctions under this section."8 9
This provision is intended to prevent the type of "satellite" litigation gen-
86. 22 N.Y. CODES R. & REGS. § 130-1.1(c)(2) (1988) (effective Jan. 1, 1989).
87. See Menaker, supra note 5, at 35.
88. Other significant provisions include: (1) Section 130-1. l(b), where if the award or sanction is
against an attorney, it may be imposed upon the attorney personally or upon a "partnership, firm,
corporation, government agency, prosecutor's office, legal aid society or public defender's office"
with which the attorney is associated. This provision necessitates associations of attorneys securing
malpractice insurance; (2) Section 130-1.3 directs payments of sanctions by an attorney to be depos-
ited with the Client's Security Fund which was set up pursuant to § 97-t of the State Finance Law to
recompense victims of dishonest lawyers; (3) The entire provision is inapplicable to town or village
courts, to proceedings in a small claims part of any court, or to proceedings in Family Court com-
menced under Article 3,7,8 or 10 of the Family Court Act (§ 130-1.1(a)); (4) Section 130-1.4 specifi-
cally extends the sanctioning powers to judges of the housing part of New York City Civil Court.
This could have widely felt implications in landlord-tenant dispute areas brought in the hundreds of
thousands annually.
89. 22 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. § 130-1.1(c) (1988) (effective Jan. 1, 1989).
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erated by Federal Rule 11.90 The assumption necessitating this provision
is that attorneys will use the rule itself as a tool for harassment and
abuse. Whether the above quoted language will actually deter such be-
havior remains to be seen.
Another provision, Part 130.5, states that the general sanctioning
provision shall not apply to requests for costs or attorneys' fees under
CPLR section 8303-a.91
Finally, Part 130-a applies the rule differently in criminal cases. Ac-
cording to 130-a, the sanctioning rule applies only to an attorney's unjus-
tified failure to attend a scheduled court appearance, in which case a
maximum fine of $250 per incident is authorized.92 Presumably, existing
constitutional protections for criminal defendants prevent a general ap-
plication of Part 130.
93
It would appear from the permissive language used in the Rule that
partial attorneys' fees or sanctions could be awarded on a finding that
one of several claims or defenses is frivolous, unreasonable or groundless.
Part 130 says the court "in its discretion, may" award attorneys' fees and
costs if the elements of the rule are met.94 Since the court is given this
broad latitude of discretion it would seem logical that its options are ex-
90. Siegel, New and Broad Sanction Rule Takes Effect on Jan. 1, 1989: Up to $10000 Awardable
for "Frivolous Conduct", 347 N.Y. STATE LAW DIGEST, at 2, col. 2 (Nov. 1988).
91. Recall that under N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 8303-a sanctions are imposed only for a
frivolous claim or defense. Part 130 can be construed so as to be available in tort cases for frivolous
motions or other conduct. Section 130-1.5 says that what the rule doesn't apply to is a "request"
subject to N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 8303-a, and the only "request" subject to that provision is one
relating to a claim or defense. Since a request relating to something like a motion in a tort action is
not subject to N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 8303-a, one can conclude that the new rule is free to
operate on it.
92. Section 130-2.1 provides that in determining whether an attorney's failure to appear at a
scheduled court appearance was without good cause, the court must consider "all of the attendant
circumstances." These include, but are not limited to: (i) the explanation, if any, offered by the
attorney for his or her nonappearance; (ii) the adequacy of the notice to the attorney of the time and
date of the scheduled appearance; (iii) whether the attorney notified the court and opposing counsel
in advance that he or she would be unable to appear; (iv) whether substitute counsel appeared in
court at the time previously scheduled to proffer an explanation of the attorney's nonappearance and
whether such substitute counsel was prepared to go forward with the case; (v) whether an affidavit or
affirmation of actual engagement was filed in the manner prescribed in Part 125 of the Uniform
Rules of the Trial Courts of the Unified Court System; (vi) whether the attorney on prior occasions
in the same action or proceeding failed to appear at a scheduled court action or proceeding; (vii)
whether financial sanctions have been imposed upon the attorney pursuant to this section in some
other criminal action or proceeding; and (viii) the extent and nature of the harm caused by the
attorney's failure to appear.
93. See Dixon, supra note 77, at 19, col. 1; see also Casenote, The Right To Counsel and Frivo-
lous Appeals: Assistance to the Court or Advocacy for the Indigent Client - Which is the Real Mc-
Coy?, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 921 (1989).
94. 22 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 130-1.1(a) (1989).
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pansive enough to include only a partial award of attorneys' fees as a
sanction.
Part 130, however, does not set forth the proper manner of deter-
mining the amount of "reasonable" attorney's fees. Nor does it give any
indication of how the amount of the sanction, if awarded, is to be deter-
mined. The court can grant the one "[iln addition to or in lieu" of the
other, but both together cannot exceed 10,000 dollars.95 The rule, there-
fore, is only penal in nature. If it were designed to make the parties
whole, there would be no monetary limit since attorneys' fees can, and
often do, exceed 10,000 dollars. Presumably, the frivolity of the action
will be discovered early on, before any substantial expense has been
incurred.
A determination of the reasonableness of attorney's fees ordinarily
requires a consideration of such factors as the professional reputation of
the lawyer,96 the type of litigation involved,97 the time, labor and skill
involved,98 and the result achieved.9 9 When the court is applying Rule
130 for the purpose of reimbursing "reasonable" attorney's fees, it would
have to take these factors into consideration. On the other hand, many
judges might find it easier to award expenses in the form of a sanction. In
either case, the deciding judge must explain how the amount was deter-
mined and why it is appropriate.
Another issue raised by the Rule is the relationship between Part
130 and Disciplinary Rule 7-102 of the New York Code of Professional
Responsibility. " It is unclear whether an award of attorney's fees under
Part 130 will provide a basis for disciplinary action under New York's
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Under Rule 7-102, a lawyer shall not "file a suit, assert a position,
95. 22 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 130-1.2 (1989).
96. See Randall v. Packard, 142 N.Y. 47, 36 N.E. 823 (1894); Simmons v. Government Employ-
ees Ins. Co., 59 A.D.2d 468; 400 N.Y.S.2d 99 (2d Dept. 1977); Jordan v. Freeman, 40 A.D.2d 656,
336 N.Y.S.2d 671 (Ist Dept. 1972).
97. See Simmons v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 59 A.D.2d 468, 400 N.Y.S.2d 99 (2d
Dept. 1977); Gross v. Moore, 14 A.D. 353, 43 N.Y.S. 945 (1897); Re Mildeberger's Will, 122 Misc.
743, 204 N.Y.S. 881 (N.Y.Surr.Ct. 1924).
98. See People ex rel. Johnson v. Bd. of Supervisors, 45 N.Y. 196 (1871); Re Pet Rack Distribu-
tors, Inc., 81 Misc.2d 727, 365 N.Y.S.2d 360 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
99. See Randall v. Packard, 142 N.Y. 47, 36 N.E. 823 (1894); Koerner v. Associated Linen
Laundry Suppliers, Inc., 270 A.D. 986, 62 N.Y.S.2d 774 (Ist Dept. 1946); Subin v. U.S. Fidelity &
Guaranty Co., 21 Misc.2d 1082, 194 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Sup.Ct. 1959).
100. The Code of Professional Responsibility, as promulgated by the American Bar Association
in August, 1969, was adopted by the New York State Bar Association as its own code of ethics,
effective January 1, 1970. For a text of the Code, see N.Y. JUD. LAW (Appendix) (McKinney 1975);
See infra text accompanying notes 100-02.
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conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of his
client when he knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve
merely to harass or maliciously injure another."' 0 1 He is further subject
to discipline if he "knowingly advances a claim or defense that is unwar-
ranted under existing law."' 0' An attorney violating either of these
precepts, which mirror the definitions of frivolity in Part 130, could be
subject to both an award of attorneys' fees under Part 130 and a discipli-
nary proceeding under Rule 7-102.
At the time of publication of this comment, there have been only
two reported cases in which a court has invoked the sanctioning power
authorized by Part 130 of the Rules of the Chief Administrator. 0 3 In
Winters v. Gould,"° decided March 27, 1989, a party brought an action
in the Supreme Court, New York County, against a Housing Judge. The
plaintiff, Winters, was a tenant in a prior proceeding wherein the land-
lord was awarded possession of the premises for nonpayment of rent and
a money judgment for back rent.'O' The petition alleged that the Housing
Judge failed to follow the procedural requirements of the Uniform Rules
for the Civil Court'06 by failing to set forth his conclusions of fact.
The Justice presiding denied the petition on two grounds. First, the
petitioner failed to pursue the proper remedy to review a claimed error in
the Civil Court, namely through an appeal.'0 7  Second, and more ger-
mane to the result in the case, the petitioner had a repeated history of
evading rent and had been involved in "five lawsuits and twenty motions
in his effort to avoid paying rent." 1 Chiding the petitioner as a
"chronic abuser of the judicial system"'09 and citing his actions as a
"paradigm example of the need for sanctions,"" 0 the court assessed the
maximum permissible sanction of 10,000 dollars."' It further stated:
101. N.Y. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT DR 7-102(A)(1) (McKinney 1975).
102. N.Y. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT DR 7-102(a)(2) (McKinney 1975).
103. Three other cases actually cited the OCA's rules but did not impose sanctions because the
cases arose prior to the Rule's Jan. 1, 1989 effective date. See In re Application of Troni, 147 A.D.2d
394, 395, 537 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (Ist Dept. 1989); Kolers v. State of New York, 141 Misc.2d 1079,
1085, 535 N.Y.S.2d 931, 935 (Ct. Cl. 1988); Frerks, v. landoli, 147 A.D. 672, 538 N.Y.S2d 281 (2d
Dept. 1989).
104. 143 Misc.2d 44, 539 N.Y.S.2d 686 (Sup.Ct. 1989).
105. Winters v. Gould, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
106. 22 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. title 22, § 208.43 (1986). Winters v. Gould , 539
N.Y.S.2d at 687.
107. Winters v. Gould, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 689.
108. Id. at 688.





This Court believes that the $10,000 limit does not provide adequate au-
thority to prevent egregious conduct. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, Rule 11, a federal court can impose sanctions without any specified
monetary limit. A monetary limit of $10,000 could become a mere cost of
litigation and this could lessen the necessary deterrent effect. The Court
should be able to make the sanction sufficient to deter the offense.
1 12
This criticism points to one of the possible shortcomings in the OCA's
enactment and may be a point of divergence when and if the New York
legislature decides to supersede the rules.
In the only other reported decision, Application oflsseks,1 t3 decided
July 27, 1989, the Supreme Court, Special Term Orange County, sanc-
tioned the petitioner, a vice-president of the local Board of Education,
5,000 dollars for actual expenses and attorney's fees incurred by the re-
spondent Board of Education in defending petitioner's frivolous preac-
tion motion to depose various board members in order to facilitate
framing her complaint. 14
The positive aspects of a rule such as that outlined above are readily
apparent: sanctions preserve judicial resources; deter groundless claims
and defenses; and reinforce the integrity and importance of our right of
access to the judicial system.
III. NEGATIVE EFFECTS
As the concurrence in Gabrelian indicated, there are a number of
risks inherent in a rule that punishes litigants and their attorneys for
actions deemed frivolous. The most obvious of these is that the rule itself
will become a source of significant abuse.I15 In fact, Federal Rule 11 pro-
vides an example. One critic asserts that Rule 11 became an "opportunity
for personal grudge matches between lawyers" and "another way of
harassing the opponent and delaying the case." 116 Many fear that the
rule will "spawn satellite litigation that 'pits lawyer against lawyer in a
very unseemly way.'" 117 Conversely, lawyers who have mutual social
ties or repeated business dealings may reach a "quiet conspiracy" -
112. Id.
113. 544 N.Y.S. 2d 471 (Sup. ct. 1989).
114. Id. The Court found that petitioner had sufficient information to frame a complaint with-
out the use of preaction deposition and her refusal to withdraw her deposition motion, despite the
Court's prodding, warranted sanctions. Id. at 472-473.
115. Recall that Part 130.1(c) provides that the court's sanctioning powers extend to unwar-
ranted motions made by attorneys for sanctions pursuant to Part 130. See supra note 4.
116. Lewin, Rule 11 Sanctions: Tool or Weapon? 99 L.A. DAILY J., Oct. 7, 1986, p.4, col. 3.




"you don't raise Rule 11 against me, and I won't raise it against you." 118
Either way, it is readily conceivable that the result will be an increased
tension in litigation and an increased amount of extra motions and ap-
peals. The question then becomes one of "cost efficiency." Will it "take
more judicial time to deal with the motions for sanctions than will be
saved by the reduction in abusive litigation due to the threat of
sanctions?" 19
A second serious risk is that such a rule will stifle legitimate devel-
opments in the evolution of law - the "chilling effect." Succinctly
stated, "today's frivolity may be tomorrow's law." 120 In a system where
many minority and unpopular causes often depend on public interest
lawyers, the threat of sanctions may lead civil rights lawyers and others
to "simply 'play it safe' when evaluating novel or disfavored claims."12
This could result in a legal system that will "tilt toward a conservatism,
which could become stultifying."' 2 Is it possible that any claim that is
unsuccessful, in retrospect, could be deemed unreasonable? A bad faith
requirement lessens this possibility, but a court might find evidence of
bad faith simply in a lack of reasonable basis in law or fact, such that the
two distinct tests actually collapse. Indeed, "The line between a position
that is 'intriguing but wrong' and one that is so wrong that its advocate
should be punished, exists mostly in the mind of the reasoner."' 23 At the
very least, "self-interest may lead to an overly conservative view of the
merits of a client's case."' 2 4
A third possibility is that attorneys and litigants will be punished
unjustly by judges who hold a bias. For attorneys, this threatens the "in-
dependence of the bar." Because of a bad faith requirement, the court
118. See Lewin, supra note 116, at 4, col. 3. This risk is lessened if the sanctioning statute or rule
grants the power to the court to raise the issue of frivolity sua sponte.
119. Chase, Sanctions in State Courts - Proposed Rule Needs Changes, 198 N.Y.L.J., Oct.22,
1987, Oct. 22, 1987, at 32, col. 1.
120. See Nelken, supra note 28, at 1341 (quoting Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and its Enforce-
ment: Some "Striking" Problems With Federal Rule of Civil Procedure,11, 61 MiNt. L. REv. 1
(1976). For a startling example of this in federal court, see Lewin, supra note 114, at 4, col. 4 (Glaser
v. Cincinnati Milacron Inc., 808 F.2d 285 (3rd Cir. 1986) ($165,000 sanction against plaintiff's
attorneys in a toxic exposure case where counsel used enterprise liability theory to join 89
defendants)).
121. See Nelken, supra note 28, at 1343 ("Although civil rights cases accounted for only 7.6%
of the civil findings between 1983-85, 22.3% of the rule 11 cases involved civil right claims.") Id. at
1327. See also, Frivolous Lawsuits and Racial Bias, 81 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 12, June 15,
1989, col. 2 (Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure's effect on affirmative action cases).
122. See Chase, supra note 119, at 32, col. 1.
123. Id.
124. See Nelken, supra note 28, at 1344.
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must always determine the motives of the attorney and the client. Nor-
mally, a lawyer is given wide latitude in his choice of strategy. With the
presence of a sanctioning rule, a judge may ultimately be second-guessing
the strategic choices of the lawyer. One commentator explains that the
court cannot delve into motives "without an unseemly inquiry in which
counsel is placed on the witness stand."12 Because of the fear of sanc-
tions, "attorneys will find it increasingly difficult to exercise independent
judgment on behalf of clients.""2 6 The same observer believes it is
"wrong in principle to impose a sanction when the claim or defense as-
serted has at least some merit." ' 7 Closely related is the effect this could
have on the lawyer-client relationship. The goals of the adversary system
can hardly be furthered in a situation where the lawyer knows that even-
tually he may have to take a position antagonistic to his client in order to
avoid penalties.
As mentioned, the possibility of judicial bias is a risk. It has been
suggested that the "bedrock of judicial independence" - the enjoyment
of life tenure - is not available to state judges, hence, "[t]his must be
considered in assessing a proposal to increase the power of the courts to
punish attorneys and litigants who appear before them."12 This pressure
is twofold: it stems from the "impulse to protect links with political lead-
ers, many of whom practice law, or have ties to people who do"; and
from "the demands of the press and the judicial administration that cases
be processed rapidly." '129 While no one would assert this as a primary
risk central to the decision whether to legislatively grant judges a sanc-
tioning power, it is equally naive to believe that these pressures are never
felt, consciously or unconsciously.
While overcrowded court calendars and a backlog of cases is a seri-
ous judicial problem warranting our attention, frivolous claims and de-
fenses by the bar are not necessarily the only cause. One commentator
explains:
The Court Administration plainly recognizes that their staffing, facilities
and procedures have lagged behind the growth of both the population and
the kinds of transactions and relationships that engender legal disputes. The
familiar call for more judges, new courthouses, greater automation and
larger staffs, and the inauguration of an individual assignment system re-
flect recognition that litigants' abuses are, at most, only a part of the
125. See Chase, supra note 119, at 32, col. 1.
126. Id. at 32, col. 2.
127. Id. at col. 1.
128. Id.





Another commentator argues that the pursuit of frivolous claims and
defenses is only a very small percentage of abusive conduct in the courts.
He views the crux of the problem as abusive disregard for procedural
requirements:
The most frequently encountered abuse in our courts is the cavalier flouting
of clear procedural requirements. Too many attorneys, for example, treat
deadlines clearly imposed by the rules, or by a judge, as nonexistent, even
after they have been given second and third chances to meet them. Others
disregard obvious requirements to produce documents or answer interroga-
tories or even respond to a summons.
13 1
His solution is the drafting of a rule limiting the authorization of sanc-
tions to "acting or failing to act in a manner which violates an applicable
time limit, other rule of procedure or judicial direction." 132 Indeed, he
suggests: "[W]ould it not be wise to accumulate more experience under
CPLR section 8303-a before expanding the scope of sanctions for frivo-
lous pleadings?"
133
The negative effects outlined above can be minimized with proper
care and attention. Indeed, various provisions in Parts 130 and 130-a
serve to eliminate some negative effects. For instance, the fact that a
court may award sanctions on its own motion prevents a silent agree-
ment among members of the bar not to invoke the rule. Likewise, since
frivolous conduct includes a motion under Part 130, the danger of the
rule itself becoming a source of litigation is substantially reduced. Simi-
larly, the risk of abuse or error by judges is curtailed through the proce-
dural requirements of an opportunity to be heard and a written
memorandum.
The danger of a chilling effect is also minimized in various ways.
For one, the definition of frivolity in Part 130 is quite strict. Only pa-
tently abusive conduct is likely to come within the ambit of such phrases
as "completely without merit" and undertaken "primarily." The stan-
dard is not met if there is reasonable argument for extension, modifica-
tion or reversal of existing law. Thus, attorneys continue to have some
leeway in their strategic choices. Further, attorneys have the opportunity
to abandon the claim once frivolity is apparent.
Other ill effects can be avoided through judicial enforcement charac-
130. See Menaker, supra note 5, at 32.
131. See Chase, supra note 119, at 32, col. 2.
132. Id. at col. 3.
133. Id. at col. 2.
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terized by sensitivity to the pursuit of novel claims and unpopular posi-
tions. It is critical, though, that judges have an express power to reach
cases of egregious and repeated disregard for the system.
1 34
IV. CONCLUSION
Parts 130-a and 130 are narrow exceptions to the American rule
that attorneys' fees cannot be awarded to a prevailing party absent a spe-
cific statutory provision or an agreement between the parties. Under the
rules, the court, in its discretion, may award attorneys' fees to either
party if it finds the attorney's conduct is without merit in law or fact or is
undertaken for abusive reasons. Parts 130 and 130-a provide adequate
procedural provisions to safeguard against any party and/or his attorney
being sanctioned improperly. These safeguards include the requirement
that the sanctioning judge give the abusing party a chance to be heard.
If the court chooses to administer sanctions, the judge must set forth his
reasons in a written memorandum.
The OCA enactment is a significant step in the move to stop abusive
conduct in New York State courts. The enactment is evidence of a grow-
ing concern among the legal community that bad faith litigation prac-
tices need curtailment. The gravity of the problem, though, requires a
clear message to attorneys and litigants alike. A real possibility exists
that the judiciary will be hesitant to sanction under the rules because
they lack the weight and authority of a legislative enactment. Likewise,
attorneys may sense the judiciary's hesitancy and themselves fail to in-
voke the rules. Thus, the New York legislature should adopt the OCA's
well-drafted provisions. Moreover, as the Winters v. Gould1"I holding
suggests, the legislature should remedy the aspects of Part 130, such as
the 10,000 dollar monetary limit, that it deems inadequate.
BARBARA A. SCHAUS
134. The majority in Lezak recognized, "[e]xisting remedies for such conduct, such as discipli-
nary proceedings for attorneys, contempt or possibly criminal proceedings if pejury is involved, or
seeking redress in a separate action for damages on theories of malicious prosecution or abuse of
process have not proved effective to deter frivolous litigation in the past. Thus, the assessment of
attorney's fees and disbursements has become the single most important device suggested to deter
such misconduct." 69 N.Y.2d 1, 4, 503 N.E.2d 681, 682, 511 N.Y.S.2d 216, 217 (1986).
135. 539 N.Y.S.2d 686. See also supra notes 103-111 and accompanying text.
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